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Before Holocaust Memory: 
Making Sense of Trauma Between Postmemory and Cultural Memory 
 
My mother has Alzheimer’s.  She was diagnosed in the early 1990s.  Over the years her 
ability to remember recent events has got steadily worse.  In time my phone calls with 
her—she in Bexhill-on-sea on the south coast of England and I in Perth, Australia—got 
circular; and the circle became steadily smaller.  She had a routine of questions she would 
ask.  As the disease progressed the time it took my mother to forget the answers that I had 
given to her questions, and then to forget that she had asked the questions, got shorter.  
She would ask the question again, and again. 
Through this period, until his death in February 2002, my father, her husband, 
remained her principal carer.  In 1998 I visited them, a trip I made every three years or so.  
My father opened the door of their flat and we went into the lounge-room where my 
mother was sitting.  After a few moments of small talk my father went to the kitchen to 
make us all a cup of tea.  A very English ritual!  As my mother started to ask me 
questions about my trip and my presence in the flat a feeling of uneasiness and 
disorientation crept over me.  She began by asking me how the journey had been.  Then 
she started suggesting that I must have had considerable difficulties.  She said how 
pleased she was that I was staying—speaking as if I was a visitor rather than her son.  
And then she started referring to Germany.  I started feeling uncanny.  I hadn’t been to 
Germany on this trip.  In fact I have only been there twice.  By this point I was 
thoroughly confused.  Luckily my father came back into the room.  My parents married in 
October 1940, a year after the outbreak of war.  My father recognised the memory my 
mother was calling up. 
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As I have discussed elsewhere, my mother is Jewish, a Jew who married out and 
has spent her life determinedly assimilating; wanting to be a middle-class English 
woman.1  Such an ambition was understandable in the context of the time.  Ari Sherman 
reminds us that: 
The [pre-war] refugee crisis brought painfully into consciousness the ambiguities 
of assimilation, especially in a country as relatively insular and monochromatic 
culturally as Great Britain in the pre-war period; and the anxiety over the numbers 
and conspicuousness of the refugees, their sheer foreignness, the likelihood that 
they would stir not only anti-Semitism but anti-German feeling still latent from 
the First World War, was shared by government officials as well as Jewish 
communal leaders.2 
Louise London has commented on the pressures in England to assimilate which “made 
[Anglo-Jewish leaders] distinguish between different groups of refugees.”3 Victor 
Jeleniewski Seidler was born in England in 1945, the child of a Polish Jewish refugee 
family which, as he puts it, “had escaped from continental Europe just before the war.”4  
Seidler writes how “becoming English” was important because: 
to be English was to be “safe.”  It was this safety that parents were ready to 
sacrifice for, and it was part of their deep and unquestioned gratitude to England 
that they also tried to pass on to their children.5 
He adds that: “Our [refugee] parents, scarred by the horrors of Nazi rule looked forward 
to their children ‘becoming English.’”6  My mother was not a refugee but she understood 
the importance of assimilation as a means to at least provisional safety in England, and 
wanted it both for herself and her children. 
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Through the 1930s some German-Jewish refugees managed to leave Germany and 
made their way to England.  London writes that: “The bulk of the emigration occurred in 
the nine months preceding World War II, when over 40,000 Jewish refugees entered 
Britain, only 11,000 or so came before November 1938.”7  In 1933, Anglo-Jewish leaders 
“promised the government that the community would shoulder the burden of this new 
influx.”8  London writes about the pleas for financial help that appeared in the Jewish 
Chronicle.  After Kristellnacht, in November 1938, a high ranking deputation from the 
Council for German Jewry made representations to the Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, to facilitate the temporary admission of young people under seventeen for 
training and education.9  The result has become known as the Kindertransport, an 
operation which brought around 10,000 unaccompanied children, almost all Jewish, from 
Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to Britain.  Walter was one of these 
children.  He arrived in England in March 1939, aged eleven and was picked up from the 
train station by my mother and one of her sisters. Walter came from Berlin.  He was 
seven when the Nazis passed the Nuremberg anti-Jewish racial purity laws and lived 
through Kristallnacht.  Up until I came to write this chapter I knew only that he was a 
refugee who had stayed with my mother’s family10.  Walter was one of the “perhaps 
40,000 Jewish refugees” that the Home Office grudgingly accepted into the British 
population after the war.11  Subsequently, he went to the United States.  What happened 
to Walter, though, is not the point of my story. 
As the effect of the Alzheimer’s deepened, my mother had started mapping events 
from her past onto the present as a way of making sense of her here and now.  For her, 
this man who had come to visit, this unrecognised stranger, was the Holocaust survivor 
whom her family had taken in.  But it is much more complicated than this.  In the late 
1930s there was no Holocaust—the Holocaust, as we shall see, was a discursive 
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construction of the 1960s and 1970s.  Indeed, in the late 1930s the crucial, exterminating 
events of the Judeocide were still yet to happen.  For my mother and her family, as for 
other English Jews, Walter and the rest of the German-Jewish refugees were escapees 
from the largest pogrom ever conducted against European Jews. 
In my mother’s mind Walter and I doubled.  I, her son born in 1950, became the 
young refugee who had brought home to her, literally, the horror of what was unfolding 
across the English Channel.  In conversations with my sister, the early child of the 
marriage, it seems she was treated with similar emotional brutality to me.  It was as if our 
mother was constantly trying to distance herself, as if she was frightened of us, or as if we 
brought up for her a nameless terror that she could not face—that respectable, middle-
class English women did not have—as if, perhaps, in the end, she was frightened for us. 
Growing up in a Jewish refugee family, Seidler writes, “was to grow up in the 
shadows of the Holocaust—the Shoah.”12  Seidler tells us that: 
in our families we were to be protected from the cruelties of the past.  As children 
we were to represent hope and the future and we were to live without the stains 
and injuries of the past.  This was to protect us as children, but this was also to 
make things easier for our parents who often found it difficult to speak about what 
had happened to them.13 
I have already remarked that my mother was not a refugee, nor was her family.  However, 
turning twenty in 1935, she learnt to fear the Nazis as her ancestors in the Pale had feared 
the Cossacks and, later, the Polish and Russian pogroms.  She lived in the certain 
knowledge that, were circumstances in England to change, she would not be able to 
protect her children; she would not be able to protect herself.  At the same time, after 
1945 this was the past, unless, indeed, circumstances changed radically. 
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My mother’s reaction to the Judeocide, as she came to understand what was 
happening, and what had happened, was her determined, perhaps pathological 
assimilation.  For her, assimilation seems also to have been the best way she could protect 
her children.  She gradually lost touch with her family.  I went to my last Jewish familial 
gathering when I was about eleven.  Seidler remarks that: “As children we learnt about 
the war and we were told about the Nazis but often this was in generalized terms, 
sometimes as an early warning against thinking we could marry anyone who was not 
Jewish.”14  Implicit here is the demand that Jewish tradition be preserved.  My mother 
would have been pleased for me to marry out, it would increase my assimilation.  It 
would, she would have thought, increase my safety in this threatening world.  Similarly, 
there was no talk in my family about the Nazis, or about the war.  For my father, Gentile 
that he was, there was little to discuss about the war by the 1950s and 1960s.  This helped 
my mother to keep silent about the Judeocide and, indeed, helped to produce an 
environment inimical to its discussion.  Such silence may well have been a part of my 
mother’s protection, keeping her children safe from the knowledge of such awfulness.  In 
the non-logic of everyday life she may well have had some thought that if my sister and I 
did not know about the Judeocide—and, as I will go on to discuss, in the 1950s and 1960s 
this was not accepted public knowledge—then we could more easily assimilate into that 
dominant culture where it was also not generally known about. 
In my mother’s mind, Walter and I, two strangers who had come to stay in the 
family, had merged, conjoined across approximately sixty years by her anxieties in 
relation to the Judeocide.  Sigmund Freud comments on the double that: “From having 
been an assurance of immortality, it becomes the uncanny harbinger of death.”15.  In this 
case the relationship between those doubled was articulated by the death of six million of 
my mother’s, and my people.  My unease at being misrecognised as a German-Jewish 
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refugee was compounded by my greater unease founded in my mother’s bequeathal to me 
of her unimaginable terror in the face of the Nazi Judeocide. 
In this chapter I will explore the relationship between personal knowledge and 
public knowledge, between the constructions of personal knowledge, as mediated by 
narrative memory and postmemory, and collective memory, which is now usually thought 
about by way of a distinction between social memory and cultural memory.  I want to 
discuss these intersections with reference to the Holocaust.  More specifically, I want to 
discuss the complexities of growing personal awareness as this took place in conjunction 
with the historical formation and public acceptance of the discourse of the Holocaust, a 
discourse the establishment of which coincided with what Saul Friedlander described in 
his 1982 book Reflets du Nazisme (translated as Reflections of Nazism) as a “new 
discourse” of Nazism.16  This involved the return of Nazism by way of films, novels and 
even popular music—before Sid Vicious’ 1976 punk song recorded by the Sex Pistols, 
“Belsen Was a Gas,” Serge Gainsbourg, the notorious French-Jewish chanteur released 
an album in 1975 entitled Rock Around the Bunker which included tracks called “Nazi 
Rock,” “Yellow Star” and “S.S. in Uruguay.”  Freidlander identifies this upsurge, in the 
words of his book’s subtitle, as a preoccupation with “kitsch and death.”17  It also 
involved a more or less pornographic working over of the mechanics of the Judeocide. 
My coming to terms with my relation to the Judeocide coincided with, and was 
inevitably influenced by, these two developments in cultural memory.  Indeed, as a 
secular Jew with no formal Jewish cultural capital my growing awareness of what it 
means to be Jewish was inevitably tracked on my increasing understanding of what 
happened to European Jewry, and this as the Judeocide was getting constructed as 
genocide, itself a new term, and as the Holocaust.  In this chapter, then, I shall also write 
about what I shall call, coining a neologism, the traumascape of my life.  Writing about 
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my own traumascape places it within the context of personal myth which Kali Tal defines 
as “the particular set of explanations and expectations generated by an individual to 
account for his or her circumstances and actions.”18  Here, traumascape refers to those 
events which, in retrospect, I can construct into a personal narrative influenced by 
transgenerational haunting and postmemory, a narrative about coming to terms with 
trauma—trauma in this case handed on from my mother as affect. 
Cultural Memory and the Discourse of the Holocaust 
In his discussion of the generic technique he calls traumatic realism, Michael 
Rothberg remarks that, “traumatic realism is an attempt to produce the traumatic event as 
an object of knowledge and to program and thus transform its readers so that they are 
forced to acknowledge their relationship to posttraumatic culture.”19  The traumatic event 
to which Rothberg is referring is the Holocaust.  But when and how did the Judeocide 
become culturally traumatic, and for whom?  Writing about individual experiences, Ernst 
van Alphen argues that, 
experience of an event or history is dependent on the terms the symbolic order 
offers.  It needs these terms to transform living through the event into an 
experience of the event.20 
His point is that sometimes, as with Holocaust survivors, it is not necessarily the horror of 
what has happened which makes it impossible to talk about, to narrativise, but rather that 
there is no appropriate discourse to transform what has occurred into experience.  “[T]he 
problem for Holocaust survivors,” he writes, “is precisely that the lived events could not 
be experienced because language did not provide the terms and positions in which to 
experience them, thus they are defined as traumatic.”21  The sense might be clearer here if 
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we substitute “traumatizing” for “traumatic.”  The events were not in themselves 
traumatic but they were traumatizing. 
When applying the model of trauma to the western experience of the Judeocide it 
is usual to anthropomorphize and think of the period between the end of the Second 
World War and the 1970s in terms of Freud’s idea of Nachträglichkeit, delayed action, 
the time between the traumatizing event and the person’s ability to narrativize that event 
as experience.  The first problem here is whether culture as such can be traumatised.  If 
trauma can be defined as referring to the effect of a shock that breaks through a person’s 
narrativized identity, can this process be applied to a culture, indeed to western culture?    
If it can, then this would suggest that western culture after the Judeocide could be 
posttraumatic.  However, while those caught up in the Judeocide found the events 
traumatizing, to suggest that western culture was itself traumatised implies a degree of 
self-consciousness not applicable to culture.  Thus, it is not until the Judeocide gets 
constructed as the Holocaust, with all the absolutist moral freight attached to that term, 
and with the discursive understanding that the Holocaust was culturally traumatic, that we 
can think of western culture as posttraumatic.  More, it is only when the Judeocide 
becomes discursively constructed as the Holocaust, and as traumatic, that there is a public 
space in which the traumas of Holocaust survivors make sense, not just as individual 
trauma but as experiences within a greater, cultural trauma.22  Only at this time can the 
individual narratives of survivors become valued as testimonies in the witnessing to a 
cultural experience of trauma.  One of the implications of this argument is that, for around 
thirty years, there was no fit between individual trauma related to the Judeocide and 
cultural understanding.  Moreover, thirty years is roughly a generation.  It is worth 
considering whether what we are actually identifying is a generational trauma—that of 
the first European post-Holocaust generation. 
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At this point it is useful to begin to think about the concept of cultural memory.  
The idea derives from Maurice Halbwachs’ work on collective memory.  In “The social 
frameworks of memory,” Halbwachs commented that: “One is rather astonished when 
reading psychological treatises that deal with memory to find that people are considered 
there as isolated beings.”23  He argues that, to the contrary: “it is in society that people 
normally acquire their memories.  It is also in society that they recall, recognize and 
localize their memories.”24 
Individual memory is constructed in a dynamic relation with society.  More specifically, 
individual memory is formed in relation to the society’s collective memory.  For 
Halbwachs: 
It is in this sense that there exists a collective memory and social frameworks for 
memory; it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these 
frameworks and participates in this memory that it is capable of the act of 
recollection.25(1992, p. 38) 
Memory might appear to be a personal matter, born out of one’s own individual 
experience but it is located in the ways the society as a whole remembers, and makes 
sense of things.  This, of course, changes over time and, with it, not only how we, as 
individuals, make sense of the world but also how we remember our experiences in the 
world. 
Halbwachs had a Catholic background.  However, his main influences, first Henri 
Bergson and then Emile Durkheim, were both Jewish, the one concerned with memory 
and time, the other with collective representations.  This at a time when Jewish identity 
was under threat from the disintegration of Jewish communal memory—or, as Yosef 
Hayim Yerushalmi puts it, using Halbwachs’ own concept: 
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The collective memories of the Jewish people were a function of the shared faith, 
cohesiveness, and the will of the group itself, transmitting and recreating its past 
through an entire complex of interlocking social and religious institutions that 
functioned organically to achieve this.  The decline of Jewish collective memory 
in modern times is only a symptom of the unravelling of that common network of 
belief and praxis through whose mechanisms . . . the past was once made 
present.26  
Omer Bartov argues that Halbwachs’ interest in collective memory was not surprising.  It 
grew out of “a France haunted by the proximity of total war and devastation, and by the 
abyss that 1914-18 had torn between the present and the pre-war past, transformed in a 
series of brutal, bloody battles into a dim, far-off, sentimental memory of a lost world.”27   
Bartov goes on: 
Nor is it mere coincidence that both the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who had 
coined and analysed this concept, and the historian Marc Bloch, who had 
pioneered the study of collective mentalities and the role of fraud and error in 
history, became victims of a historical moment in which a regime determined to 
“correct” the memory of the past had occupied a nation unable to be reconciled 
with its own memories of that same event.28 
Halbwachs was born in Reims, whence his parents had moved six years before, having 
left Alsace when it became German after the Franco-Prussian war.  That is to say, 
Halbwachs’ background was a geographical area which had competing national memories 
attempting to legitimate ownership.  Both national and communal memory anxieties, 
exacerbated by the effects of the devastation of the First World War, influenced 
Halbwachs.  Bloch, a Jew, joined the Resistance and was tortured and shot by the Nazis 
in 1944.  Halbwachs, married to a Jew, was sent to the Buchenwald concentration camp 
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where he died, after he travelled to Lyons to complain about the murder of his eighty-year 
old in-laws, both killed by either the Vichy militia or the Gestapo.29 
Where Halbwachs wrote about social memory, emphasizing the extent to which 
individual memory was imbricated with, for example, family memory, since the 1980s 
there has been a conceptual shift to the idea of cultural memory.  In the important Acts of 
Memory collection Mieke Bal writes on behalf of the contributors that: “We . . . view 
cultural memorization as an activity occurring in the present, in which the past is 
continuously modified and re-described even as it continues to shape the future.”30  Using 
the notion of cultural memory is a way of thinking outside of the roles played by 
particular social institutions in the formation of memory.  Cultural memory recognises 
that cultures reproduce and reform themselves and that, in this process, understandings of 
the past are transformed.  Furthermore, as Bal goes on to write: “The interaction between 
present and past that is the stuff of cultural memory is . . . the product of collective 
agency rather than the result of psychic and historical accident.”31  The past makes sense 
on the terms of the present and, moreover, individual understanding of the present is 
mediated by cultural memory.  The discourse of the Holocaust not only gives us a way of 
understanding certain past events, it is a means of remembering those events and, more, a 
way of understanding individual trauma that is removed from those events—trauma, we 
might say, as transgenerational haunting. 
However, before we go there, we must first briefly examine the historicity of the 
discourse of the Holocaust.  In his overview of the evolution of the discourse, Tim Cole 
asserts that: “While the Holocaust was perpetrated in Europe during 1941-45, it was not 
really until the early 1960s that anything like widespread awareness of the ‘Holocaust’ 
began to emerge.”32  At this time, as Cole indicates, the Judeocide was not yet known as 
the Holocaust.  What is often argued, and Cole repeats the claim, is that it was the Israeli 
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trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, in 1961, which brought widespread public 
knowledge of the Judeocide.  As Cole writes: “It was a trial concerned with the Shoah, 
and was a self-conscious attempt to bring awareness of the massacre of six million 
European Jews to both native-born Israeli youth and the wider world.”33  Within Israel a 
divide had evolved between the survivors of the Judeocide and the Israeli-born young 
people.  The survivors were silenced and looked down on by an Israeli generation which 
had been brought up to fight for its land. 
Ben-Gurion’s intention was to use the trial as a way of uniting Israel.  For the first 
time the survivors were able to tell their stories in a public forum.  Cole writes: 
The speaking out of these survivors in the Jerusalem courthouse became the signal 
for a more general speaking out of survivors across the country.  The silence was 
broken both within and outside of the courthouse 34 
Nevertheless, at this time there was still no possibility of understanding what had 
happened in a unifying form, and understanding it as something either unique or new, or 
both. 
Throughout this period the Judeocide was still thought of within a continuity with 
previous events.  Gerd Korman notes the great Jewish historian Salo Baron talking in 
1950 of the need to examine the “dissimilarities as well as the similarities between the 
great tragedy and the many lesser tragedies which preceded it.”35  Korman writes that, 
in 1949, there was no “Holocaust” in the English language in the way that the 
term is used today [1972].  Scholars and writers had used “permanent pogrom” . . 
. or the “recent catastrophe.” or “disaster,” or “the disaster.”36 
At the Nuremberg trial of Nazis accused of war crimes, which ran from November 1945 
to October 1946: “On numerous occasions, [Robert H. Jackson, the chief counsel for the 
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United States] and other prosecutors used the term pogrom to describe Nazi persecutions 
[of the Jews].”37  Generally speaking, the rhetoric of “concentration camps” was used as 
the key figure for the events of the Judeocide. 
Hannah Arendt, Korman tells us, looked for what was new and unprecedented in 
the concentration camps in their connection to totalitarianism 38  Arendt was certainly 
arguing strongly for the novelty of what had taken place.  In her book on the Eichmann 
trial published in 1963 as a compilation of reports she had written at the trial itself which 
had been published in The New Yorker, she wrote about: 
[H]ow little Israel, like the Jewish people in general, was prepared to recognize, in 
the crimes that Eichmann was accused of, an unprecedented crime, and precisely 
how difficult such a recognition must have been for the Jewish people.  In the eyes 
of the Jews, thinking exclusively in terms of their own history, the catastrophe that 
had befallen them under Hitler, in which a third of the people perished, appeared 
not as the most recent of crimes, the unprecedented crime of genocide, but, on the 
contrary, as the oldest crime they knew and remembered. . . . None of the 
participants ever arrived at a clear understanding of the actual horror of 
Auschwitz, which is of a different nature from all the atrocities of the past, 
because it appeared to prosecution and judges alike as not much more than the 
most horrible pogrom in Jewish history.39 
While the Eichmann trial increased awareness of the Judeocide it did not do so in terms 
that would make it culturally understandable as a traumatic episode.  Rather, what had 
happened was placed within a normalizing historical narrative, and this in both Jewish 
and dominant western perspectives. 
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In the United States Paul Breines argues that it was the 1967 Six Day Arab-Israeli 
War which marked the turning point in Jewish public awareness of the Judeocide.  
Breines writes: 
It is really only after the June 1967 war that we see the proliferation of scholarly 
studies, films, courses, lectures, conferences, tough Jewish fiction, and intense 
popular discussion.  Among American Jews, Israel’s victory in June 1967 
expanded and escalated what had previously been a limited relationship to the 
Holocaust.40 
Breines’ argument, in his words, is that: “The Israeli triumph in the Six Day War 
provided American Jews with the imagery of Jewish toughness and politico-military self-
assertion which enabled them to rethink the Holocaust as something more than simply 
Jewish passivity and victimization.”41 
It needs to be remembered that Breines is writing about Jews, and specifically 
American Jews.  In general, there was an increased awareness among Jews of the 
circumstances of the Judeocide during the decade of the 1960s.  For Jews as a 
community, there began to be established a cultural memory of the Judeocide which 
understood it in terms of disaster or catastrophe and placed it within a narrative of such 
events.  The Yiddish term khurban carries this kind of understanding.  For Jews outside 
of the community, I think for example of myself here, and for the general population, 
there was still little cultural knowledge of the Judeocide.  It was an event in the Second 
World War, and a minor one in the context of a narrative about Allied victory over the 
Axis forces. 
When the Judeocide was thought about it was in the particularized, piecemeal, 
terms of concentration camps, and the treatment of inmates within these camps.  This was 
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in part a consequence of the screenings of film footage taken by the Allied forces when 
they liberated the concentration camps.  Bergen-Belsen was the first camp entered by 
British troops and, as Cole writes: “The harrowing film footage of piles of corpses was 
shown in British cinemas shortly after liberation on 15 April 1945, and ensured that 
‘Belsen’ became a synonym for Hitlerian atrocities.”42  By the 1960s this footage was 
rarely shown.  In my own experience, at the age of twelve or thirteen I had much greater 
access to literature, mostly war novels, about Japanese atrocities on allied servicemen in 
Prisoner of War (POW) camps.  At that time I had no clear understanding of the 
difference between POW camps and concentration camps so it was easy to imagine what 
I read happening in these POW camps as the horror of concentration camps.  This 
Japanese POW camp literature worked within the dominant narrative of the Second 
World War.  It functioned by way of a binary of British/European civilization and Asian 
savagery.  In the process it served to occlude the Judeocide and reinstate the values of 
colonial modernity. 
What transformed knowledge of the Judeocide and established it in cultural 
memory as a defining moment in modern, western history was the discourse of the 
Holocaust.  It seems that there are rare cases of the use of “holocaust” to describe the 
destruction of European Jewry during the Second World War.  However, the Israeli 
memorial of remembrance, Yad Vashem, founded in 1953, was still translating shoah as 
“Disaster” in 1955.43  Korman dates the new usage of Holocaust to between 1957 and 
1959.  It was used at the Second World Congress of Jewish Studies held in Jerusalem in 
1957.  After 1959 Yad Vashem gave “Holocaust” its official imprimatur, switching from 
translating shoah as Disaster to Holocaust.  We find here also the origin of the 
capitalization of Holocaust.  This practice, following the capitalization of Disaster, 
suggests the special, transcendent, quality of the events being named.  Raul Hilberg’s 
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magisterial The Destruction of the European Jews, published in 1961, still did not use 
Holocaust.44  Peter Novick writes that, at the time that Hilberg was writing his doctoral 
thesis at Columbia: 
The Holocaust had not, at this point, become as sacralized as it was subsequently 
to become.  But there was already a great deal of visceral resistance to its being 
discussed in terms other than the confrontation of pure evil and pure virtue.45 
The word, and the discourse associated with it, was not yet fully established.  However, 
Breines tells us that: “By 1967 Holocaust, with its immense and eventually mind-
numbing resonance, was becoming the central term of Jewish American discussion and 
identity.”46  Korman notes that by 1968 there were so many books making use of the term 
that in that year the Library of Congress’ Catalogue Division established a new category 
for “Holocaust-Jewish, 1939-1945.”47 
However, Holocaust was still used more in the United States and still 
predominantly within the Jewish community.  It was, without a doubt, the NBC 
miniseries Holocaust, shown in the United States in 1978 and subsequently around 
Europe to massive television audiences, that got the word Holocaust general acceptance.48  
The point here, though, is not just about the take up of a word, it is about the discourse 
expressed through that word.  The immense popularity of the miniseries suggests that the 
Judeocide was already becoming a part of a general, non-Jewish cultural memory.  The 
utility of the discourse of the Holocaust has been that it not only unified the disparate 
events of the Judeocide such as Kristellnacht, the race laws, the concentration camps, the 
ghettos, and so on, it has also provided the site of meaning for the Judeocide.  Lawrence 
Langer has argued that: “In one sense, all writing about the Holocaust represents a 
retrospective effort to give meaningless history a context of meaning.”49  Identifying the 
Judeocide as the Holocaust has the same result. 
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The miniseries helped to establish the Holocaust as having a western universal, 
that is no longer specifically Jewish, theme.  The western world could now think of the 
events of the Judeocide as the Holocaust, as a morality story about Good and Evil.  At the 
same time, in its new discursive form the Judeocide could be thought of as a total entity 
rather than in terms of concentration camps, massacres, ghettos and so on.  More, the 
discourse satisfied Arendt’s concerns, the Holocaust was thought of as unique and 
unprecedented—at least in part no doubt a consequence of the championing of the term in 
the 1960s by writers such as Elie Weisel.  The Holocaust also embraced another of 
Arendt’s preoccupations, that the Judeocide be thought of as genocide.  Genocide now 
became the key for understanding the horror of the Holocaust—that the Nazis had aimed 
for the destruction of an entire people.  However, as I have remarked, the general 
construction of cultural memory in terms of Holocaust discourse did not take place until 
the time of the television miniseries.  In England in the 1970s people could still remark 
that an exceptionally thin person “looked like something out of Belsen” (note the 
distantiating objectification here), and, as I have mentioned, Sid Vicious could write 
“Belsen Was a Gas” for his band Flowers of Romance in 1976, a song subsequently 
recorded by the archetypal punk band the Sex Pistols with Ronnie Biggs, the Great Train 
Robber, in 1977.50 [On the history of “Belsen Was a Gas” see Jon Savage (1992). 
Trauma and Postmemory 
What was it like to grow up in this environment in England in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
son of a fearful assimilating Jew who had no way of talking about her own fears brought 
about by what the Nazis had done and, indeed, no discourse in which to conceptualize 
what had happened?  Most importantly, I think, my mother, like many thousands, 
possibly tens of thousands, of others, had no way of understanding her relationship to 
what had taken place as traumatizing.  Post Traumatic Stress Disorder was formally 
 258
accepted as a medical diagnosis in 1980 in the wake of the Vietnam War when it was 
included in the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 51.  Trauma only became a publicly recognised 
way of thinking about the effects of certain events on individuals in the 1980s.  Even then 
it has only been applied to those directly affected by events happening to them personally, 
such as sexual abuse, or caught up in events such as the Vietnam War and, 
retrospectively, the Holocaust.  Given her situation in post-World War II England, my 
mother’s, most probably unconsidered, solution was silence.  How could my mother even 
consider it worth contemplating to talk about, for example, how she felt when Walter 
came into her apparently safe, middle-class Anglo-Jewish family life with his tales of the 
persecution of people just like her in Germany?  How could she think it important to work 
through—to use a Freudian term now much in vogue with therapists, but a term, and a 
way of thinking that would have been completely unknown to her—her reactions to her 
growing knowledge that the Jews who had at first been persecuted and ill-treated across 
that short distance of the English Channel were later actually being rounded up for 
extermination?  And this when the Nazis had occupied the Channel Islands in 1940 and 
looked set to invade England.  After the war my mother would have had no language to 
discuss her reactions to the film footage from the concentration camps and her anxieties 
for the future that her children were being born into, and in any case, nobody with whom 
she could talk about these things who could understand what they meant to her.  Certainly 
not my father, the man she had married for, among other things, his Englishness, his 
situatedness as English within England; his certainty of his place. 
Elsewhere I have recounted the only two times during my childhood that I 
remember my mother acknowledging the events that had not yet come to be thought of as 
the Holocaust.  Once was a disconcertingly light-hearted reference to “the Germans 
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killing all our relatives over there”—as close a paraphrase as I can recall.  The other was 
her rage when she discovered that the birthday present I had given her had been made in 
Germany.52  I knew, even then, that her anger was disproportionate, indeed inappropriate, 
to what she saw as the offence I had committed.  Looking back I can suggest the 
connection between her anger and her fear, emotions born of her reactions to events that 
she had no way of expressing and no context for understanding. 
How has all this, my mother’s unrecognized trauma, manifested in my life?  One 
way of thinking about this is through Nicolas Abraham’s idea of transgenerational 
haunting discussed in Chapter Six.  We can complement this idea with Marianne Hirsch’s 
notion of postmemory which she explicitly ties to trauma.  She writes: 
I use the term postmemory to describe the relationship of children of survivors of 
cultural or collective trauma to the experiences of their parents, experiences that 
they “remember” only as stories and images with which they grew up, but that are 
so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right.  The 
term is meant to convey its temporal and qualitative difference from survivor 
memory, its secondary or second-generation memory quality, its basis in 
displacement, its belatedness.  Postmemory is a powerful form of memory 
precisely because its connection to its object or source is mediated not through 
recollection but through projection, investment and creation.53 
My mother is not a survivor in the conventional sense, a sense by the way which has only 
become conventional since the establishment of the discourse of the Holocaust.  My 
mother, like so very many others, has no stories and images of rapid evacuations or 
atrocities that she has handed on.  Rather, my mother’s trauma was a secondary effect, a 
trauma brought on by witnessing what others went through, albeit at a mediated remove, 
and the fear that their fate could become her own, or her children’s.  What was passed on 
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was a vague focus—beware of Germans, they do awful things; they murdered Jews 
during the Second World War.  This was not a phantom, it was evident in the two stories 
which I have told and it was a constant presence in my mother’s attitude to German 
people and to, for example, news stories in the paper or on television concerning 
Germany or Germans; if a German had been killed in an accident she might remark 
“Good riddance.”  It is also not strictly postmemory in that it was a reaction that was 
passed on, a reaction expressing an emotional complex made up of fear, anger, perhaps 
sadness and other emotions.  All these passed on without realization, a legacy composed 
of affect. 
Hirsch identifies well the expression of postmemory.  The manifestation of the 
next generation’s inheritance of the trauma in displacement, its belated repetition acted 
out, as she writes, in projection, investment and creation.  It is these phantasmatic 
repetitions, retrospectively identified and narrativized, that I am describing as a 
traumascape.  For large numbers of the second generation after the Judeocide, this 
postmemorial acting out coincided with attempts to find out, and understand, what had 
happened—and in my case, and doubtless that of many others, to situate myself somehow 
in relation to this knowledge.  In “Projected Memory” Hirsch retells my friend Mitzi 
Goldman’s story, “her strange memories of the Jewish school she attended, where, on 
rainy days when they could not go outside at lunchtime, the children were shown films 
about the Holocaust.”54  I did not go to a Jewish school and I did not have such 
questionable assistance in finding out what had taken place.  Furthermore, finding out 
was, in itself, complicated, as I now realise, by the changing cultural memory of the 
Judeocide. 
Let me begin to describe some of my own traumascape with a school story of my 
own.  To the best of my knowledge I was the only Jew, certainly in my year—there may 
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have been others in the school but I was so totally, if uncomfortably, assimilated that I 
didn’t seek them out—and, with my very English family name, they didn’t come looking 
for me.  I do remember a rather overweight younger boy called Schlomo but I never even 
thought of him as Jewish.  My English teacher was a young, Christian, Cambridge-
educated man.  Thoughtful and kind, he had an ability to enthuse us, me anyway, with the 
literature he had us read.  During a number of classes when I was, I think, fifteen, he 
worked through an anthology of modern English verse.  Two of the poems in that 
collection were by Sylvia Plath, “Daddy” and “Lady Lazarus.”  Plath wrote both these 
poems in 1962.  My memory is that our teacher said little or nothing about the Jewish 
references in the poems.  Rather, he concentrated on the suicide theme in “Lady Lazarus.”  
What is it, the class wanted to know, that the narrator—and is the narrator here indeed the 
author?—has done again, and does, it seems every ten years?  Even then, before the rise 
in teenage suicides, discussing this with sixteen-year-olds was not easy.  Much of the 
class time was taken up with teasing out the narrator’s emotional state.  In “Daddy” the 
discussion, in my recall, centred on the female narrator’s relationship with her father.  My 
school was single-sex and most of us were boarders.  A poem which explored the 
relationship between father and daughter from the daughter’s point of view was 
fascinating for boys of our age.  It seems extraordinary today to think that these poems 
could have been talked about in a school class without referring to their take-up of the 
Judeocide but, again, we must remember that this was a class of non-Jews—how could 
what happened to the Jews be relevant—and, besides, what had taken place in the 
concentration camps was surely too awful for the impressionable minds of fifteen-year-
olds. 
I was left to ponder these poems on my own.  What had they to do with me, to do 
with me being a Jew?  What is the anguish in “Lady Lazarus,” I wondered.  What has 
 262
suicide got to do with Jews?  I understood Plath to be describing the horror of the 
concentration camps, a term I knew: 
Ash, ash— 
You poke and stir. 
Flesh, bone, there is nothing there— 
 
A cake of soap. 
A wedding ring. 
A gold filling. 
I connected with the affect though I did not know why.  I had heard stories of the skin of 
victims being turned into lampshades, something to which Plath refers in the poem’s 
second stanza.  I knew, what I now understand to have been British propaganda, that 
Nazis had made soap from the Jewish bodies.55  I did not know that the Nazis had taken 
the wedding rings and the gold fillings and made piles of these.  The poem wove in and 
out of my little knowledge.  It conjured feelings I had that I could not explain, and that I 
had no space to talk about and no way to talk about in that classroom with those boys. 
“Daddy” was not quite as powerful for me.  I related to it more incoherently.  The 
speaker appeared to be the Jewish daughter of a German and a Jew; I was the Jewish son 
of an Englishman and a Jew.  At the same time the poem’s attitude to the German father 
resonated for me with my mother’s attitude towards Germans.  In particular there was this 
stanza: 
An engine, an engine 
Chuffing me off like a Jew. 
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A Jew to Dachau, Auschwitz, Belsen. 
I think I may well be a Jew. 
I knew Belsen had been a concentration camp.  I had never heard of Dachau.56  I 
identified with the speaker’s uncertainty about her Jewishness and empathized with the 
inevitability, in spite of her uncertainty, of her being sent to a camp.  Importantly, the 
poems spoke to me about this Jewish experience.  They broke my mother’s silence and I 
realised that there were people out there who knew and thought and wrote about these 
things. 
What I didn’t know then was that Plath was not Jewish, was not herself the 
daughter of a mixed marriage.  I accepted relatively unproblematically that the speaker of 
“Daddy” was the speaker of “Lady Lazarus” and that she was Plath, the author.  James 
Young has written about Plath’s use of the image of the “Holocaust Jew,” the victim.  He 
explains that: “The Holocaust exists for her not as an experience to be retold or described 
but as an event available to her (as it was to all who came after) only as a figure, an idea, 
in whose image she has expressed another brutal reality: that of her own internal pain.”57  
For me at fifteen, the emotional pain in the poems connected with the pain that I had 
inherited and, expressed through the imagery of Jewish suffering in the camps, and at the 
hands of the Germans, offered me a way of beginning to think about these things and 
myself as a Jew.  My emotional investment in these poems can, I think, be understood as 
an example of the work of postmemory.  In this sense they mediated for me a knowledge, 
and an affect, which has been handed on to me in the silence of repression. 
For a different purpose I have briefly written about the relationship I had with a 
Jewish woman while in my twenties.58  In terms of my traumascape this needs to be set in 
a context.  During my final year as an undergraduate, a couple of years before I met this 
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woman, I had a shortish relationship with a German exchange student who had come to 
Bradford University where I was studying.  How to make sense of these two relationships 
symptomatically, closely juxtaposed as they were?  My relationships with a German and 
then a Jewish woman can be read as an acting out of my fraught relationship with my 
mother and, simultaneously, an attempt to come to terms with my own Jewishness.  There 
was, I think, a certain frisson of transgression for me with my German friend.  This was 
not a relationship I ever told my mother about.  There was a sense in which it was a 
rebellious act, as indeed was my later relationship for my mother had not formed my 
identity as an Englishman to have me go out with a Jew.  However, while this was also a 
rebellious act, and one linked by the same context, it was of a different order.  What could 
be construed as evidence of my failure to assimilate was different from my sleeping with 
the enemy. 
At the time I met my German friend in the very early 1970s, I still had not thought 
through what for me was not to become the Holocaust until the late 1970s—though I 
must say that I felt very relieved when she mentioned (though was this by chance?) that 
her parents had been in Africa during the war.  I had been to Germany once, for a couple 
of days on a camping holiday with friends when we had driven across Europe to Italy and 
back.  Being in Germany had disturbed me.  Today I would say that I felt uncanny.  
Seidler tells a story about visiting Poland with his partner.  On Warsaw station she left 
him to go and report a robbery.  He writes: “Waiting in the station for Anna felt fine at the 
beginning but then I felt uneasy and nervous.”59.  He goes on: “when Anna returned from 
a different direction about forty minutes later I knew that I just needed to leave.  I could 
not deal with the insecurities that were emerging and I felt terribly unsafe.”60(2000, p. ix) 
I was much younger than Seidler on my first visit to Germany and much less in touch 
with my feelings.  All I knew was that for some reason I was on edge, that being there 
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made me feel uncomfortable.  I didn’t connect the feelings with my mother’s hatred of all 
things German or with her silenced fears over the Judeocide.  There was, it seems, a two-
fold process at work here: my feeling of uncanniness which was the result of my 
transgenerational haunting and my feeling of unease, anxiety at being in Germany, which 
was the affect of the phantom that I had inherited. 
My German friend went to university in Saarbrücken.  I visited her there once.  By 
this time her English had somewhat declined and my German, which I had learnt as a 
special subject at school—and done worse in than any other subject I had taken—was 
negligible.  My friend took me to meet some friends of hers.  This I could understand.  
Then she took me to meet some more, and more wanted to meet me.  I began to think 
something strange was happening.  I tackled my friend about it.  She told me that word 
had got round that I was Jewish.  These young people in their early twenties knew that the 
previous generation, maybe their parents or relatives, had destroyed the Jewish population 
of Saarbrücken, and of Europe.  They themselves had never met a Jew. 
I was aghast, not so much at being an exhibit (for me now it has disturbing 
colonial connotations of being a specimen) as being exhibited as a Jew.  Me, totally 
assimilated, with no knowledge of Judaism, no Jewish cultural knowledge, whatever that 
might be, was being taken by these people as an example of those no longer present in 
Germany.61  The complex, unconscious intertwinings of desire and death which drove my 
friend’s and my relationship—what, after all, was her stake in this?—had been 
transformed, for me, into a very confrontational moment.  While I had felt safe with my 
friend, helped no doubt by knowing that the French border was so very close, I was now 
led in a most confrontational way to the knowledge that my mother had repressed and, 
seemingly, had wanted me to not to know. 
 266
Twenty years later Saarbrücken got its own anti-memorial to what, by 1990, was 
generally known as the Holocaust.  Jochen Gerz made his first anti-memorial in 1972, the 
year of my visit.  As James Young writes: “Between 1972 and 1998 [Gerz] has . . . 
opened a new generation’s eyes to the essential incapacity in conventional public 
institutions like the museum or the monument to serve as wholly adequate sites for 
Germany’s tortured memory of the Holocaust.”62  At Saarbrücken, Gerz’s students 
secretly removed cobblestones from the square leading to the Saarbrücken Schloss, 
engraved their undersides with the names of disused Jewish cemeteries in Germany and 
replaced them.  The Gestapo had occupied the Schloss during Hitler’s Reich.  The town’s 
Jews had been brought to the square on Kristallnacht in 1938 to be publicly humiliated.  
The remnants of Saarbrücken’s Jewish population had been assembled in the square to be 
deported to Gurs in southern France on October 22nd, 1940.63  At the time of my visit this 
kind of information was not public, general knowledge, not a part of local cultural 
memory. 
The autobiographical narrative that I am constructing leads towards a 
consciousness of the Judeocide, understood in the late 1970s in the terms of the discourse 
of the Holocaust, and a gradual awareness of my situatedness as a Jew in relation to the 
Judeocide.  Another important moment in this trajectory came around the time I met my 
Jewish friend, shortly after I had gone to the University of Essex to study for my Masters.  
Sometime in 1973 or 1974 somebody at the university showed a print of Vittorio De 
Sica’s 1971 film, The Garden of the Finzi-Continis.  De Sica’s reputation was made in the 
Italian neo-realist movement of the late 1940s and 1950s.  After a long, relatively fallow 
period The Garden of the Finzi-Continis was highly acclaimed and won De Sica an Oscar 
for Best Foreign Language film.  These were the things I knew about the film when I 
went to watch it in one of the university’s larger lecture theatres.  What I did not know, or 
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chose to ignore, was that this is a film about anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.  I had 
never given much thought to what had happened to the Jews in Mussolini’s fascist Italy. 
The film asks to be read as an elegiac evocation of a lost era of harmonious 
community relations before fascism transformed Italy.64  The Finzi-Continis are a very 
wealthy and assimilated Jewish family who live in palatial circumstances with a large, 
wonderful, peaceful garden protected from the world outside by a high wall.  As fascism 
takes hold the family retreat behind their wall.  The film begins in 1938.  Much of its 
narrative concerns Giorgio’s doomed love for his childhood friend, Micòl of the Finzi-
Continis.  Giorgio comes from a middle-class Jewish family which, in spite of the father’s 
attempts to put a positive light on Italian fascism, is increasingly affected by the new laws 
restricting the lives of Jews.  Micòl retreats into her family’s private world.  Finally, one 
day in 1943, the fascist police come to the Finzi-Continis’ home, identify them in a roll-
call and take them to an assembly point with the other Jews of Ferrara, prefatory to 
deportation to a concentration camp. 
In the film’s narrative the menace increases slowly and subtlely.  As a viewer I 
became totally involved.  When the police came to take the Finzi-Continis away I found 
myself on my feet shouting at the screen.  What was it that I was feeling—anger at the 
fascist destruction of these Jews; anger at the Finzi-Continis for their passive acceptance 
of their fate?  I don’t know.  I think probably both.  The Finzi-Continis’ behaviour must 
have reminded me of my mother’s determined assimilation, and maybe even her apparent 
refusal to confront what had happened in the Judeocide.  Equally, I had, I think, found my 
anger at what the Nazis had done—an anger which was also my mother’s anger 
transgenerationally haunting me but, as well, a postmemory acted out in a projection onto 
De Sica’s film.  I sat down embarrassed and confused.  My friends, none of whom were 
Jewish, didn’t mention the incident. 
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Living In Posttraumatic Society 
One marker, at least for me, for the spread of what Friedlander calls the new discourse of 
Nazism was Liliana Cavani’s 1974 film, The Night Porter.  This film stars Dirk Bogarde 
as Max, an ex-Nazi officer who now, in 1957, works as a night porter in a hotel in 
Vienna.  To this hotel comes Lucia, played by Charlotte Rampling, and her husband.  It 
turns out that Lucia was a young prisoner in the concentration camp where Max was 
stationed.  In the camp Max had forced Lucia into a sexual relationship with him.  Now, 
many years on, the two return to that sado-masochistic relationship within the 
claustrophobic confines of Max’s apartment room.  Analytically, we could read this as 
traumatic repetition.  I went to see this film with my Jewish friend when it was released in 
England and found myself speechless and riven with anxiety.  I remember us leaving the 
cinema, silent and awkward with each other. 
As Friedlander documents, through the latter part of the 1970s there was an 
outpouring of literature and film, fiction and non-fiction, about Hitler and Nazism.65  
Much of it was taken with the erotic qualities of the Nazis.  Cavani’s film, with its 
portrayal of tortured sex intermingling with violence, was the respectable tip of a 
pornographic iceberg the most notorious filmic example being Ilsa, She-Wolf of the S.S., 
also released in 1974.  Ilsa was set in a Nazi slave labour camp—actually the set of the 
television series Hogan’s Heroes—in which Ilsa, played by Dyanne Thorne, is the camp 
commandant.  She has two preoccupations, having sex with the male prisoners, castrating 
those who fail to satisfy her, and experimenting to find out if women can stand more pain 
than men.  A large number of these films are set in concentration camps.  These include 
the Italian-made Last Orgy of the Third Reich (1976) and the American Prisoners of 
Paradise (1980).  In some, but by no means all of these films, such as Last Orgy and Nazi 
Love Camp 27 (1977), the women are supposed to be Jewish.  My point here is that the 
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concentration camp films were a sub-genre within this new representational concern with 
Nazism, and that these are not, in the first instance, Holocaust pornography.  Lucia, in 
The Night Porter, is described as the daughter of a socialist, she is not identified as Jewish 
although in the flashback to her round-up there are many in the group wearing yellow 
stars.  These films come out of the post-Second World War narrative in which what 
happened to the Jews was simply one aspect of the war. 
Friedlander argues that the preoccupation with Nazism offers a way of expressing 
opposing needs to be found in modern civilization: 
Modern society and the bourgeois order are perceived both as an accomplishment 
and as an unbearable yoke.  Hence this constant coming and going between the 
need for submission and the reveries of total destruction, between love of harmony 
and the phantasms of apocalypse, between the enchantment of Good Friday and 
the twilight of the Gods.66 
Embedded in this dichotomy is modernity’s preoccupation with sex and male violence as 
an imbricated unity for which the concentration camp topos became the perfect vehicle.  
We cannot discuss this in detail here but we can note Slavoj Zizek’s comment that 
concentration camps are “the ‘perverse’ obverse of twentieth-century civilization.”67  As I 
have argued in Chapter Three, concentration camps can be traced back to the eighteenth 
century and the rise of the modern state.  In Freud’s modern story of the origin of society 
he describes the primal horde and tells how the sons banded together to kill the Father so 
that they could gain access to the women of the horde whom the Father had kept for 
himself.  Here, we find male desire and male violence intimately linked.  This fantastic 
story is recapitulated in the familial Oedipus complex where the young son’s desire for 
the mother, to be satisfied by killing the father and taking his place, is thwarted by the 
son’s fear of castration.  Freud comments that: “A considerable amount of aggressiveness 
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must be developed in the child against the authority which prevents him from having his 
first, but none the less his most important, satisfactions.”68  This characterization of the 
male child’s sexual life in the modern, nuclear, privatised family, with its freight of 
aggression, returns us to the idea of concentration camps by way of the German author 
Dieter Duhm who, in Angst im Kapitalismus (Fear in Capitalism), published in 1972, 
described families as “this massive number of private concentration camps.”69  However, 
this is a recapitulation of a more profound modern structure.  Concentration camps 
provide a patrolled space for the extreme violence that had been acted out previously—
and continued to be acted out—by the Europeans on the Others identified on the colonial 
periphery.  What the Nazis imported into the concentration and death camps, and into the 
space of Europe, was the modern, historical production of Same and Other, a production 
expressed in the distinction between “European” and “non-European” and, by the 
nineteenth century, “white” and “coloured.”70  This historical construction of Difference 
was a founding moment of narcissistic trauma which gets acted out as excessive, 
sexualised violence on those constructed as Other. 
Andrea Dworkin, in her account of pornography as the expression of male sexual 
violence against women, Pornography, argues that the Nazis: 
created a kind of sexual degradation that was—and remains—unspeakable.  Even 
Sade did not dare to imagine what the Nazis created and neither did the Cossacks.  
And so the sexualization of the Jewish woman took on a new dimension.  She 
became the carrier of a new sexual memory, one so brutal and sadistic that its very 
existence changed the character of the mainstream sexual imagination.  The 
concentration camp woman, a Jew—emaciated with bulging eyes and sagging 
breasts and bones sticking out all over and shaved head and covered in her own 
filth and cut up and whipped and stomped on and punched out and starved—
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became the hidden sexual secret of our time.  The barely faded, easily accessible 
memory of her sexual degradation is at the heart of sadism against all women that 
is now promoted in mainstream sexual propaganda.71 
I am arguing that, rather than being a new figure, the Jewish concentration camp woman 
is the expression of what has always been repressed and marginalized—literally, to the 
colonial periphery—in modernity.  From this point of view, the Sadean expression of 
power through sexual violence is normative rather than deviant.  She is, then, not a new 
sexual memory but an unrepressed one.  One element of our posttraumatic society is that 
the image of the Jewish concentration camp woman has become normalized.  Joan Smith 
has written about William Styron’s novel Sophie’s Choice (published in 1979) that “the 
secret of the novel’s popularity [is that] the juxtaposition of sex and the Holocaust has 
been dressed up as art, thus sanctioning its passage from the back rooms to the shelves 
reserved for the literary.”72  In this book the concentration camp survivor is not Jewish, 
allowing for a more general identification.  Given the normalization of the concentration 
camp woman as the legitimised expression of male sexual violence against women, it is 
not surprising that motifs that appear in the concentration camp film genre, such as 
women being fed to dogs in Last Orgy, repeat documented actions carried out with 
regularity on the colonial frontier. 
The corollary is that descriptions of what took place in concentration and death 
camps and, indeed, the actual images photographed at the time, became pornographic 
opportunities for sexual arousal—even, perhaps especially, for Jews.  Thus, for example, 
in his autobiography, Alan Kaufman, born in the Bronx to a French survivor and an 
American-Jewish father, tells how, one day going through the books in the children’s 
section of the public library on Grand Concourse, he found a misshelved book with 
photos taken in the camps: 
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There followed photograph after photograph of naked corpses piled up in pits and 
on wagons and arranged on the ground. 
In one such picture I caught the curve of a beautiful breast, looked more closely.  
There was a matching breast visible, equally voluptuous, the pair belonging to a 
shapely body spread pinwheeled on the ground, head flung back and mouth agape.  
The soft, pretty face was not skeletal like the others.  I could imagine the woman 
alive, developed an erection.  Eyes closed, envisioned my fingers cupping her 
breasts, penis grazing her lips . . . When I opened my eyes, saw that she was dead 
among others, anonymously, her teeth jutting from her limp jaw, her legs twisted 
unbecomingly in the open pit, my erection shrivelled instantly.73 
Kaufman associates the dead woman with his mother, whose behaviour betrays her 
traumatised connection with her past and with whom he has a relationship of intermingled 
love and fear.  This gives a reason for his particular reading of these images.  However, 
Kaufman’s interaction with these images is much more common.74  As is indicated in the 
quotation from Dworkin, these images of naked women, and men, and the narratives 
about what was done to them, can all too easily be appropriated as pornography—which I 
am defining very briefly here as culturally transgressive images that a reader appropriates 
voyeuristically as sexualized.  With these images and descriptions the modern discourses 
of history and pornography commingle. 
This commingling is even more fraught when it comes to reenactments.  
Discussing Schindler’s List, Alan Mintz writes that: 
Among the Hollywood conventions that Spielberg is least willing to part with, 
according to his detractors, is the intimate connection between violence and 
sexuality.  Despite the high calling and supreme sensitivity supposedly embodied 
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in the making of the film, Schindler’s List carries over the same eroticization of 
female victimhood found in many lesser, exploitative films on the Holocaust and 
in the general run of Hollywood entertainment.75 
The most egregious example is usually taken to be the Auschwitz shower scene where the 
naked women wait fearfully, to be relieved to discover that that the jets deliver water not 
gas.  Placing the scene within what I have called the concentration camp genre, Omer 
Bartov comments that it “would be more appropriate to a soft-porn sadomasochistic film 
than to its context (and here Spielberg comes dangerously close to such films as Cavani’s 
The Night Porter and Wertmuller’s Seven Beauties).”76.  The debate over whether there is 
gratuitous nudity in the shower scene—which has a history in a Hollywood soft-porn 
genre, that of male coming-of-age films such as Porky’s (1982)—or a legitimate portrayal 
of what went on in the camps is, ultimately, impossible to resolve because what happened 
in the camps was, itself, an expression of the extreme sexual violence that haunts 
modernity. 
Bartov writes about a form of literature available to adolescents in pre-1967 Israel.  
This was: 
passed secretly from one youth to another, read at night under a street lamp far 
from the eyes of adults, hidden under stones in the backyards of tenements, never 
brought home, hardly ever discussed, a source of illicit excitement and shameful 
pleasure.  These were the so-called Stalags, a type of pornographic literature that 
circulated in Israel of the time, written by anonymous (but most probably Israeli) 
writers, replete with perverse sex and sadistic violence.  The excitement evoked in 
young readers by such pulp fiction stemmed both from the encounter with forms 
of human activity kept tightly sealed from them by the puritanical nature of pre-
1967 Israeli society and from the fact that the central sites for these actions were 
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the concentration camps.  Nothing could be a greater taboo than deriving sexual 
pleasure from pornography in the context of the Holocaust; hence nothing could 
be as exciting.77 
Whilst the specificity is particularly worrying here, that young Israeli Jews—
predominantly male, one would think—should learn about sex and sexual relationships by 
way of Holocaust pornography, such pornography utilizing concentration camps became 
relatively common in the west, as the concentration camp film genre makes clear.  What 
the topos of the camp has offered has been the opportunity to portray the most extreme 
forms of sexual violence available to the modern imagination within a historically 
validated legitimating context. 
Where Zizek implies that the concentration camp remains distinct from post-
Holocaust society, Ka-Tzetnik, the concentration camp survivor and author of the 
Salamandra sextet about life in Auschwitz in which he novelised the fate of his family 
and himself, argues that, “if Auschwitz is another planet, then we are still living on that 
planet today.”78  In this post-Holocaust society, the excessive aggression and sexual 
violence that underlies modern society, and which was brought home to Europe and 
played out in the concentration and death camps, has been accepted into the everyday 
where it is traumatically repeated in representations and acted out in everyday life. 
The new discourse of Nazism, really a newly overt preoccupation, coming in the 
1970s, roughly thirty years after the end of the Second World War, was a product, more 
or less, of that generation that came of age after the war, the post-war generations.  This 
discourse was an appropriation and working over in many forms of the Nazi legacy.  
When English punks used the swastika as a part of their fashion bricolage, it was from 
within this new awareness of, and coming-to-terms with, Nazism by the following 
generations.79  In 1978, when the punk band Joy Division named themselves after slang 
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for a concentration camp barracks where forced prostitutes were kept—taken, indeed, 
from the second of Ka-Tzetnik’s sextet, The House of Dolls, the fictionalised account 
published in 1956 of what had happened to his sister, and a book that Bartov describes as 
sharing some of the characteristics of Stalag pulp fiction 80—the transgression was in 
response to the terms of the discourse of Nazism not of the Holocaust.81 
However, the discourse of the Holocaust was becoming established and the two 
discourses were beginning to overlap, especially after the watershed of the British 
showing of Holocaust in 1978.  These two discourses, individually and in complex 
combination, reconstituted cultural memory in Britain and in the west generally.  The 
discourse of Nazism opened a space in which the war and the Nazi Reich could be 
discussed and worked over in popular culture.  The discourse of the Holocaust, as I have 
already explained, enabled the various events of the Judeocide to be understood as a 
totality and for there to be debates about its unprecedentedness, its uniqueness, and its 
unrepresentability.  The discourse also enabled the Judeocide to be understood as a 
cultural trauma. 
Hirsh writes that: 
postmemory is not an identity position, but a space of remembrance, more broadly 
available through cultural and public, and not merely individual and personal, acts 
of remembrance, identification, and projection.  It is a question of adopting the 
traumatic experiences—and thus also the memories—of others as one’s own, or, 
more precisely, as experiences one might oneself have had, and of inscribing them 
into one’s own life-story.82 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s there developed a space in which the inherited trauma of 
the Holocaust could be publicly understood and legitimised, where personal trauma could 
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be made sense of in relation to a cultural memory of the Judeocide as the culturally 
traumatizing event of the Holocaust.  At this point my own knowledge of what had 
transpired coupled with my traumascape, my repeated actings out of my inherited fears 
and confusions related to the Judeocide, meshed with the new cultural memory of the 
Holocaust in what now could be identified as posttraumatic society.  This was the time 
that I could begin my own journey to understand the impact on me of my mother’s 
traumatic relation to the Judeocide and its haunting of my psyche. 
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